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Abstract
Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has 
evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 
United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use 
of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What 
can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the 
protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches 
the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international 
norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the 
diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of 
civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-
constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of 
member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and 
their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, 
we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. 
Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, 
while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate 
implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated 
through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, 
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the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also 
providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.
Keywords
Interpretivism, norms, practice theories, protection of civilians, United Nations 
peacekeeping, use of force
Introduction
In principle, the protection of civilians (PoC) plays an increasing role in United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping. As a direct result of the failures of Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the mandates of 90% of UN peacekeeping operations now include PoC, including the 
use of force to protect civilians ‘under imminent threat of physical violence’ (Security 
Council, 1999: 14). PoC has become a norm, defined as an intersubjective standard 
of appropriate behaviour (based on Finnemore, 1996: 22–23; Klotz, 1995: 451; 
Zimmermann, 2016: 98) of peacekeeping. It stands alongside peacekeeping’s ‘tradi-
tional’ norms and may even supersede them: the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peacekeeping Operations (HIPPO) explicitly noted that impartiality, consent of the par-
ties and the limited use of force ‘should never be an excuse for failure to protect civil-
ians’ (United Nations, 2015b: 12).
Since 1999, when the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) became the first to 
include PoC in its mandate, the norm has been well institutionalized across doctrinal and 
operational peacekeeping documents (Hultman, 2013; United Nations, 2017). This insti-
tutionalization contrasts with PoC’s implementation record, especially regarding the use 
of force. In 2014, a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services found that ‘the 
use of force … appears to have been routinely avoided as an option by peacekeeping 
operations’ to protect civilians (General Assembly, 2014: 1). This is despite the UN con-
tinuously giving guidance on how the norm could be operationalized and implemented 
to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping in reaching stated objectives and to remove 
confusion and conflicting understandings (United Nations, 2015a, 2017). How can we 
make sense of the gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of PoC and 
the wide variation in implementation?
Many constructivist approaches to norms are interested in implementation primarily 
in relation to monitoring compliance. Implementation, according to this view, follows a 
top-down approach, and authors identify sources of constraint, such as domestic veto 
players or a lack of capacity (Jacobsen and Brown Weiss, 2000; Risse et al., 2013). A 
simple explanation for the wide variation in implementing the PoC norm could be that 
national contingents lack capacity: reports have repeatedly concluded that troops on the 
ground have not been given sufficient pre-deployment training to understand how they 
should act in different scenarios (Blyth and Cammaert, 2016; Holt and Taylor, 2009; 
United Nations, 2015b). Contingents are also frequently deployed lacking even basic 
equipment or the ability to take a proactive posture and to conduct flexible and decentral-
ized missions in their areas of operation (e.g. Dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). While these 
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perspectives shed some light on PoC implementation on the ground, they do not account 
for dynamics at different levels of implementation (e.g. at the intermediary dimension in 
New York). They also work with limiting assumptions about supposedly stable norma-
tive content in portraying implementation as a top-down process.
Norm contestation scholars have criticized such sequential models by pointing to 
diverging understandings of norms, subsuming these under the theme of contestation 
(Dixon, 2017; Jose, 2017; Wiener, 2014). Open contestation, typically conceptualized in 
contentious terms (Wiener, 2009: 176; 2017: 123), may therefore lead to gaps in imple-
mentation. However, what if actors concerned with implementing a particular norm hold 
and follow different understandings of what this norm means without contesting either 
the norm or its relevance? In speaking to this question, we make three contributions to 
norm research and practice theories in International Relations (IR), as well as an empiri-
cal contribution to the peacekeeping literature.
First, most international norms, even if they are institutionalized in UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolutions or other soft and hard law, are inherently ambiguous. This 
is often the premise for having achieved compromise. States can then continue to hold 
different understandings of what particular norms mean without contesting them. While 
critical norm research starts from this premise of norm ambiguity (Hansen, 2015: 196–
197; Krook and True, 2012: 104; Sandholtz, 2008: 101; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 
2007: 221; Wiener, 2004: 198), it does not integrate it fully into analysing norms. The 
logic of contestation implicitly accepts that there is a kernel of shared normative meaning 
that can be contested (see Niemann and Schillinger, 2016: 30). If normative meaning is 
ambiguous in the first place, different understandings of norms are built into the norm 
and therefore remain present. This reasoning corresponds to arguments made by critical 
law scholars, highlighting the indeterminate nature of international law (Brunnée and 
Toope, 2013; Koskenniemi, 2011). We should therefore expect a constant diversity of 
normative meaning and consider how to ‘theorize with th[is] unfixity’ (Epstein, 2013: 
501) rather than assuming a stable normative structure that makes it straightforward to 
evaluate the behaviour of others.
Second, we argue that different understandings of norms are likely to manifest them-
selves and emerge in differing implementation practices. Here, states are faced with a 
multitude of contextual specificity (Sandholtz, 2008), combining their understanding(s) 
of the norm, how these should be applied in particular circumstances and the experience 
of conflictual norm-scapes (see also Karlsrud, 2016). Not only is normative meaning 
ambiguous, but there are also often conflicting norms that states could follow that come 
with diverging understandings of appropriateness. We show that particular understand-
ings of the PoC norm for some states come into conflict with understandings related to 
the traditional norms of impartiality, consent of the parties and the limited use of force. 
Implementation practices are thus key to understanding normative meaning(s). 
Constructivist scholarship has long highlighted the productive nature of practices 
(Guzzini, 2000; Onuf, 1982; Reus-Smit, 1997). These insights have also found their way 
into norm research (Wiener, 2004). However, such conceptualizations remain (empiri-
cally) under-specified (see Wendt, 1994). With the practice turn, a diverse theoretical 
programme has evolved that enables a closer conceptual integration of practices into 
studying normative meaning (see Bueger and Gadinger, 2015). Further, while practice 
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theories initially associated practices primarily with reproduction (Sundaram, 2017: 
140), recent contributions highlight their analytical potential for examining dynamics of 
change (Bode, 2018b; Bode and Huelss, 2018; Hopf, 2017).
Practices are patterned actions in social context (Leander, 2008: 18) that allow us to 
study concrete empirical phenomena such as actors’ diverging understandings regarding 
the substance of particular norms. Considering differentiated implementation through 
practices therefore renders this process analytically approachable and visible. This type 
of analysis recasts the process of implementation as a site where normative content 
emerges through practices rather than considering it as technical or apolitical (see 
Sullivan, 2017). This supports critical scholarship on norms in IR (Krook and True, 
2012; Sandholtz, 2008) as we see normative content manifesting and emerging through 
implementation practices, rather than considering norms (like PoC) as already ‘fixed’ or 
shared once they have been adopted and institutionalized in UNSC resolutions or other 
official UN documents.
Third, in examining how different understandings of the PoC norm emerge in imple-
mentation practices, we focus on a particular group and site where such understandings 
are voiced: military advisers to the permanent delegations of the UN in New York. 
Theories on norm localization make important arguments about how norms are differen-
tially instantiated (Acharya, 2004, 2009; Zimmermann, 2016), but they focus on national 
implementation rather than on the state-based understandings of international norms in 
the international setting of peacekeeping that we are interested in. Localization therefore 
highlights the agency of local/regional actors in the Global South in implementation 
processes, but it still refers to these actors as ‘norm-takers’ (Acharya, 2004: 240). This 
implies that they have limited immediate agency in processes of norm-making at the 
international level. Such agency considerations change if we assume that ambiguity has 
already been built into international norms, such as PoC, at the international level, 
including by actors of the Global South.
The implementation of the PoC norm is a multifaceted process covering diverse lev-
els, such as national ministries, national representatives to the UN in New York and 
national contingents at the field level. We focus on one link in this process by consider-
ing the role that military advisers play in between national ministries and the field. 
Military advisers not only provide advice and analysis to the UNSC and conduct most of 
the negotiations in developing the doctrine for UN peacekeeping, but are also involved 
in the planning, budgeting, implementation and evaluation of operations. Although these 
actors are commonly expected to execute decisions made by national ministries of 
defence and foreign affairs, in reality, those ministries are thinly staffed for substantive 
issues like PoC. That often provides New York-based diplomats, including military 
advisers, with considerable room for manoeuvre, especially in filtering information and 
deciding the content and form of reports to their capitals (Faizullaev, 2014; Karlsrud, 
2013; Schia, 2017). They are pivotal agents of norm implementation, thereby reintroduc-
ing meaningful instances of agency into implementing norms from the international level 
onwards (see Bucher, 2014).
Finally, the article makes a substantial empirical contribution to the literature on UN 
peacekeeping, and especially questions of effectiveness (see Autesserre, 2010; Bove and 
Ruggeri, 2016; Druckman and Diehl, 2013; Fortna, 2007; Howard, 2008; Hultman et al., 
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2013; Karim, 2017). We collected data on troop contributors’ attitudes towards PoC, as 
seen by military advisers, through an online survey (during September 2015), a work-
shop (during November 2015) and expert interviews (during June 2016). Such informa-
tion can provide indications of the extent to which understandings of PoC are diverse or 
shared among major contributors, offering a solid foundation for debate on how PoC 
mandates will be put into practice in the future.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: first, we describe the deliberative 
normative development of the PoC norm and its disconnects in implementation. Second, 
we expand our theoretical contribution by conceptualizing norm implementation via 
practice theories and examining the role of military advisers. Here, we also reflect briefly 
on our methodology, while including a longer discussion in Appendix I. Third, we dem-
onstrate how the institutionalized form of the PoC norm remains ambiguous, therefore 
allowing for diverging normative understandings to coexist in implementation practices 
and the role of military advisers therein. In the final section, we sum up and draw 
conclusions.
The PoC norm in peacekeeping doctrine and its 
disconnects
Originally designed to create buffer zones between conflict parties in inter-state con-
flicts once a ceasefire was in place, since the 1990s UN peacekeeping has been involved 
in more complex intra-state conflicts. These new settings have brought peacekeepers 
into closer contact with civilian populations and, with ceasefires rarely in place or 
secure, have created protection expectations. The responses of peacekeeping to this 
new environment have been varied, as shown by the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda. 
Most contingents were withdrawn following a UNSC decision to reduce mission size 
in the midst of the Rwandan genocide. However, the UN Force Commander with 
Ghanaian contingents of about 400 troops stayed behind (Kimenyi and D’Amour 
Mbonyinshuti, 2015). Using means such as negotiation and a safeguarding shelter in a 
football stadium, the Ghanaian contingents were able to protect thousands of civilians 
in a very difficult situation. The doctrinal failures of the 1990s triggered a rethinking 
of UN peacekeeping, which has, since UNAMSIL in 1999, increasingly included PoC 
among the mandated tasks. Of the 14 peacekeeping missions deployed in 2018, five 
have PoC as their main objective, while another five were charged with protecting 
civilians among other tasks. Indeed, most peacekeeping operations mandated since 
UNAMSIL have included PoC mandates. Given this fact, as well as numerous UNSC 
resolutions on PoC, indicating a growing normative foundation (Breakey, 2014; 
Hultman, 2013), we may safely say that PoC has become firmly embedded as a peace-
keeping norm.
Yet, the increasing complexity and variation across different missions has contributed 
to differing understandings as to how PoC should be implemented on the ground. In 
2009, a study found that ‘the UN Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries, 
host states, humanitarian actors, human rights professionals, and the missions them-
selves continue to struggle over what it means for a peacekeeping operation to protect 
civilians, in definition and practice’ (Holt and Taylor, 2009: 4). The study cited several 
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factors contributing to this disconnect between UNSC mandates and practice: the UNSC 
and other peacekeeping decision-makers lack awareness of the nature and circumstances 
of the threats to civilians; interpretations differ among Secretariat officials at headquar-
ters and in the field as to what the UNSC intended to do with certain mandates; and there 
have been gaps between policy guidance, planning and preparedness (Holt and Taylor, 
2009).
The study also noted how work on bridging this disconnect ought to lead to the ‘provi-
sion of the requisite political support and resources by the Member States’ (Holt and 
Taylor, 2009: 5), and raised the issue of political will to engage in robust operations. 
However, this did not include in-depth examination of the different understandings 
among troop contributors as to the PoC norm and where to draw the limits to this activity 
in connection with other core peacekeeping norms. This is what we investigate in this 
article by conceptualizing how military advisers understand and reflect on the implemen-
tation of the PoC norm.
Concurrent with the rise of the PoC norm, there has been increasing criticism of mis-
sions being deployed to situations where there is no peace to keep (United Nations, 
2000). The HIPPO report described a tendency to deploy UN peacekeeping to ‘conflict 
management’ settings — ‘violent settings without the enabling frameworks that have 
previously driven success’ — and advised that the UNSC should ‘define “success” more 
realistically in such settings’ (United Nations, 2015b: x, 28). A short-term definition of 
success could focus on protecting civilians and/or delivering humanitarian aid (Hultman, 
2013; Kathman and Wood, 2016), rather than longer-term priorities, such as strengthen-
ing inclusive and participatory state institutions, for example, through security sector 
reform. Short-term definitions of peacekeeping success therefore lead to a stronger link 
between effectiveness and the readiness to use force in peacekeeping: ‘[c]ontingents 
must deploy with the necessary equipment and training and a clear understanding of the 
mission rules of engagement’ (United Nations, 2015b: 30). However, such multidimen-
sional ‘conflict management’ missions are generally given lower chances of achieving 
longer-term success, for example, as defined in terms of comprehensive mandate imple-
mentation and long-term stability (e.g. Brosig and Sempijja, 2017; Druckman and Diehl, 
2013; Howard, 2008).1
Understanding where major troop and police contributors stand regarding ‘protecting 
civilians under the imminent threat of physical violence’ (Security Council, 1999) gained 
importance with a 2014 report on the implementation of PoC mandates (General 
Assembly, 2014). The report noted the inconsistent application of the use of force as a 
last resort to protect civilians, citing reasons such as ‘lack of willingness on the part of 
troop-contributing countries to put troops in danger’ (General Assembly, 2014: 14). 
Moreover, as Blyth and Cammaert (2016: 309) note, ‘there is a continuing lack of knowl-
edge at all levels of command regarding the mission mandate and the rights and obliga-
tions to use force to protect civilians’.
Is there a general lack of willingness among troop contributors to use force, as a last 
resort but a critical option, to protect civilians? Do troop contributors show different 
degrees of willingness as regards using force? To answer these questions, we must access 
how states understand their role in implementing the PoC norm. Research so far has not 
been able to shed much light here. Although the International Peace Institute, for 
Bode and Karlsrud 7
example, has published country profiles for several key troop-contributing countries 
(TCCs), these provide little information on where these stand on PoC and the use of force 
(e.g. Aubyn and Aning, 2013: 6). We hold that we can understand these apparent discon-
nects by considering the implementation practices surrounding the PoC norm by military 
advisers and what these mean for normative content.
The implementation of norms: A practice-based approach
Research on international norms has become a firm part of IR, associated with the 
second and third waves of constructivism. Authors in the second wave considered 
how norms emerge, the parameters of their promotion and acceptance, their often 
long periods of socialization, and their internalization (Finnemore, 1996; Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999). In contrast, authors in the third wave were inter-
ested in contestation, arguing that even though states signed up to the same docu-
ments enshrining particular norms, these were ‘contested by default’ (Wiener, 2009: 
179). A growing number of studies explored contestation and, as a result, examined 
the processes of norm emergence and diffusion in more disrupted terms (Dixon, 2017; 
Krook and True, 2012).
Neither group of theorists has considered norm implementation as a differentiated 
process that continuously accounts for the diversity of normative content as a result of 
inherently ambiguous international norms. While second-wave constructivists recog-
nized ambiguity, it was cast as something that should and could be avoided. Studies saw 
increasing the precision of normative meaning as conducive to ‘proper’ norm implemen-
tation by safeguarding against loopholes and a diversity of meaning (Chayes and Chayes, 
1993: 198; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 907; Legro, 1997). In contrast, contestation 
scholars have typically started from the assumption of ambiguous norms (Krook and 
True, 2012; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 2007; Wiener, 2004).
Yet, none of these studies has integrated ambiguity as a constant and wide-reaching 
characteristic of all normative content. Wiener’s (2017: 113) theory of contestation, on 
the one hand, highlighted norm ambiguity in pointing to ‘enacted normative meanings-
in-use’. On the other hand, in differentiating between three types of norms — fundamen-
tal norms, organizing principles and standards/regulations — Wiener (2017: 119) 
assumed that standards/regulations are less contested because these are ‘most clearly 
defined’ and ‘most detailed’. This arguably replicates second-wave assumptions about 
the possibility of increasing precision. The logic of contestation implies that a basic, 
shared understanding of a norm exists that can be contested in the first place: ‘contesta-
tion involves the range of social practices which discursively express disapproval of 
norms’ (Wiener, 2017: 112). However, what is this substance that can be contested, origi-
nally, if it is ‘contested by default’ (Wiener, 2009: 179)?
Recognizing the ambiguity of norms as constant and continuous finds echoes in criti-
cal legal scholarship dealing with the indeterminacy of international law. While much 
of the IR literature continues to treat international law as fixed and independently 
authoritative (Brunnée and Toope, 2013: 125), scholars here consider it as ‘an expres-
sion of politics’ that involves choice rather than simply ‘applying a pre-existing princi-
ple’ (Koskenniemi, 2011: v).
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If we accept that norms are always ambiguous, each norm contains multiple meanings 
(Hansen, 2015: 194). Moreover, as ambiguity and different meanings are part of what a 
norm is, when actors revert to these different understandings in their implementation 
practices and anchor their understanding of the norm by referencing other norms (such 
as impartiality) within a conflictual norm-scape, they are not contesting it. By contrast, 
the contestation literature is infused with a vocabulary of rejection and struggle; it sees 
‘normative meaning in crisis’ (Wiener, 2017: 123). However, we argue that ambiguous 
norms in a conflictual norm-scape cannot ever be ‘settled’ in content when their very 
design and presence allows for coexisting meanings (see Sandholtz, 2008).
While different meanings are thus always already there as a potential at the point of 
decision-making, we can see this when actors revert to them in their implementation 
practices. Norm localization argues that norms are differentially instantiated, but it 
focuses on national implementation rather than examining diverging understandings of 
international norms in international settings like UN peacekeeping. Changing the site is 
important because it challenges conceptions of who makes norms. Localization often 
comes with a critical, postcolonial element (Steele, 2017: 133), but in focusing on the 
regional/local levels only, it continues to cast actors outside the West as ‘norm-takers’ 
(Acharya, 2004: 240). Zimmermann (2016: 106), for example, accounts for the modifi-
cation of international norms, but only through processes of translation at the local level. 
Yet, in areas such as UN peacekeeping, the practical contribution to norm-making by 
actors outside the West is strong due to their substantial and growing involvement in the 
practical implementation of norms at international sites. While African countries only 
contributed about 27% of the total amount of troops at the beginning of the 2000s, this 
number has today increased to 49% globally and 58% on the African continent (United 
Nations, 2018).2 Their share is even higher in individual operations: African troops make 
up 70% of the UN stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (United Nations, 2018). 
Generally speaking, the shift towards stronger African participation is also reflected in 
stronger willingness to use force, although not as a uniform tendency (Karlsrud, 2018). 
These regional differences in implementation practices will therefore be important for 
the normative meaning(s) of PoC.
As discussed, because norms are inherently ambiguous, their meanings will manifest 
or emerge in implementation practices. Here, combining the theoretical insights from 
constructivist norms research and practice theories is helpful. Constructivist research 
has long addressed the significance of practices in constituting social life (Guzzini, 
2000: 155), and practices have also featured in norm research (Wiener, 2004: 199). 
However, practices as a concept have remained under-specified (e.g. Onuf, 1982; Reus-
Smit, 1997).
With the practice turn, studying practices has emerged as a dynamic theoretical 
agenda in IR. Practices result from how patterned actions are perceived and constructed 
in a social space and thereby ‘create meanings, objects and power relations’ (Leander, 
2008: 18). Practice theories have produced innovative accounts of decision-making 
(Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014; Bode, 2018b; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017), as well as of 
the substantial make-up of international relations (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Bode and 
Huelss, 2018; Pouliot, 2016). Bueger and Gadinger (2015) differentiate between two 
major groups of practice theories: critical practice theories interested in repetition/
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reproduction; and pragmatic practice theories interested in fluctuation/contingency. 
Studying practices may therefore be useful for examining how constructions are made, 
reified or changed by visualizing the processes sustaining and therefore constituting 
international relations at the micro-level (Bode, 2018a: 105).
Recognizing normative understandings enshrined in international doctrines as ambig-
uous rather than solid, we can access how states understand particular norms in consider-
ing how they implement and reflect on norms, such as PoC, through practices. The 
ambiguous foundations of the PoC norm therefore help us to make sense of the wide 
variation in implementation. This captures a different approach to understanding what 
normative content is and where it comes from, thereby aligning itself with critical norm 
research without buying into the underlying logic of contestation. Rather than seeing 
normative content as enshrined in international documents and doctrines, we consider 
what happens ‘after decision-making’ (Huelss, 2017).
Despite this pluralist approach to normative meaning, states and their military advis-
ers find themselves in (both materially and ideationally) hierarchically structured social 
spaces that have to be accounted for in analysing the implementation of the PoC norm. 
In other words, normative content is shaped in implementation but not all implementa-
tion practices are equally important. Practice scholarship has furthered this understand-
ing of power that permeates diplomatic negotiations by highlighting the importance of 
perceived competence (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017), com-
peting authority claims (Sending et al., 2015) and background knowledge (Pouliot, 2008, 
2016), and showcasing the overall dynamics of micro-level decisions (Bode, 2018b; 
Wiseman, 2015). First, in material terms, it is important to acknowledge the positions of 
actors in the peacekeeping architecture. When it comes to assessing the implementation 
practices of states around the PoC norm, only 73 out of 193 member states actually have 
designated military advisers. Further, those states contributing significant numbers of 
military personnel on the ground and/or contributing financially will likely carry particu-
lar weight. In this context, military advisers of the 20 most important TCCs, as well as 
those of the permanent five members of the UNSC (P-5), have prominent positions (see 
Table 1). These concerns served to limit the range of states that we examined most 
closely.
Second, practices can be performed more or less competently (Guzzini, 2005), that is, 
vested with more or less intersubjectively recognizable meaning (Bode, 2018b: 299; 
Lahire, 2011: 66–7). In their study of the negotiations leading up to the 2011 intervention 
in Libya, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) focused on the bureaucratic processes of 
establishing recognized competence and how these were turned into practice by skilled 
actors. Military advisers can draw on a general military background and also frequently 
have specific field experience as sector/battalion commanders of military contingents in 
UN peace operations, as well as national and, for instance, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) military operations. They will refer to their experience in discus-
sions to give weight, credibility and legitimacy to their implementation practices. Their 
competence becomes evident in their ability to represent their states’ practices as legiti-
mate in and of themselves, and as useful contributions to the evolving debate on the PoC 
norm in New York, even when they involve non-action. Military advisers find them-
selves in a ‘contest over doing’ (Gross Stein, 2011: 88) that defines their competence. 
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This also includes appealing to in-group knowledge in judging PoC implementation 
practices as competently performed.
Thus, the background knowledge and therefore potential competence of such military 
advisers as diplomats and practitioners is essentially plural. Background knowledge 
should be seen as fluid and multidimensional in nature — rendering its competent enact-
ment in practices dependent on whether military advisers are able to make timely use of 
the ‘right’ kind of knowledge. This contrasts with Bourdieusian practice theories that 
tend to work with a pre-reflective conceptualization of tacit or background knowledge 
(Pouliot, 2008), captured by the ‘inarticulate feeling for the game’ often underlined by 
sports metaphors (Pouliot, 2016: 73). This intuitive understanding of practices as reflex-
ive and their performance as ‘unthinking’ is based on a uniform incorporation of back-
ground knowledge and the so-called practical sense (Bourdieu, 1980: 101; 1987: 81), 
‘that is the product of a lasting subjection to conditions similar to the ones in which they 
are placed’ (Bigo, 2011). However, the sports metaphor, which has been so popular in 
Bourdieusian practice theories, draws exclusive attention to a type of social situation that 
demands reflexive reaction rather than choice over the diversity of social situations. In 























 United Kingdom 286
 United States 34
Note: This table uses TCC data from August 2015 as this was the basis for selecting invitees for our work-
shop. The TCC ranking varies slightly, but the composition of the list has largely remained stable since 2015. 
Permanent members of the UNSC have been italicized.
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the course of many social situations, actors work reflectively and with longer time 
frames, often explicitly drawing upon the experience of different parts of a varied profes-
sional career (Bode, 2015; Karlsrud, 2016). We therefore argue that practices cannot only 
be reflexive, but can also be produced by reflective processes (see Gadinger, 2016). 
Military advisers may draw intuitively or deliberately on varied parts of their background 
knowledge in implementing PoC across a series of situation-dependent choices (Lahire, 
2011: 149).
Further, in theory, the Permanent Delegations receive marching orders from their 
capitals. However, oftentimes, the units in the national ministries of defence and foreign 
affairs (themselves in competition) are thinly staffed for substantive issues such as PoC, 
giving great latitude of action to the Permanent Delegations (especially to the military 
advisers, where these exist) because of the relative absence of competing competence 
claims inside the diplomatic system of states. As an example, one of the military advis-
ers that we engaged with was seconded by the Ministry of Defence but worked together 
with colleagues from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had to consult with both these 
groups when establishing a position in negotiations, for example, on new official guide-
lines for UN peacekeeping. The process of implementing norms such as PoC therefore 
directs our analytical attention to a different group of actors in IR. The role of military 
advisers can also take the form of acting as information filters: they summarize infor-
mation from discussions in New York, thereby creating their specific version of events. 
Such a framing of information will involve types of emphasis, as well as omissions.3 
Military advisers also have direct communications with contingents deployed as part of 
UN peacekeeping missions in the field in order to represent their views and to contrib-
ute to, for example, discussions with UN peacekeeping headquarters’ staff on PoC 
implementation.
In sum, we argue that norms are ambiguous and therefore open to plural interpreta-
tions, which emerge within a conflictual norm-scape. We therefore propose to examine 
normative meaning through implementation practices. These arguments can help to 
account for disconnects between supposedly solid institutionalized versions of the PoC 
norm and peacekeeping practices. We study the dynamic implementation of the PoC 
norm at an international site by focusing on military advisers. Military advisers can 
reflectively and reflexively recur to diverse background knowledge when performing 
practices. They compete for being recognized as competent performers of implementa-
tion practices, attempting to set the framework for implementation policies to appear 
appropriate. This shifts our focus to how practices provide insights into the content of 
international norms, such as the use of force to protect civilians, and responds to gaps in 
the constructivist literature on norms. In making these analytical observations, our objec-
tive is not to build a formal model of norm dynamics. Rather, our arguments engage in 
‘low-level theorizing’ and produce an explorative account of how the PoC norm is imple-
mented that leaves space for the ‘messiness of practice’ (Bueger, 2017: 128).
We collected primary empirical material to access states’ implementation practices 
of the use of force to protect civilians in three ways (for a detailed account, see 
Appendix I). First, we conducted a mixed-structure online survey, which contained 
multiple-choice and open questions in four thematic areas (during September 2015). 
The survey received 30 responses, compared to 73 delegations to the UN in New York 
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who have identified military advisers. Response rates per question differed and we 
indicate the individual rates. Although responses were anonymous, the survey included 
regional identification: the European region had the strongest representation, followed 
by the Asia-Pacific group, while African member states were under-represented. To 
complement the limitations of the survey in terms of regional spread and the number 
of respondents, and to diversify our account, we gained additional information through 
a half-day military adviser workshop attended by advisers from all five regional groups 
(during November 2015) and three follow-up interviews (during June 2016). All infor-
mation was gathered under Chatham House Rules. Therefore, we do not identify indi-
vidual states in quotes. This three-pronged research strategy allowed us to cover the 
three core constituencies relevant to implementing the PoC norm in military terms: 
African, Asian and Western states (see also Figure 3). It also demonstrates a diversified 
methodological toolbox for practice-based analysis, which often relies heavily on elite 
interviews and/or focus groups. We follow an interpretive lens in using these methods 
(see Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).
The PoC norm between principles and practice: Analysis
We first outline a basic understanding of the PoC norm in UN peacekeeping, especially 
in relation to the use of force, highlighting ambiguity therein. Next, we demonstrate how 
this ambiguity leaves room for diverging understandings of the norm that manifest them-
selves in the implementation practices expressed by and debated among military advis-
ers. This will show the extent to which diverging implementation speaks to the meaning 
of the norm and the role of military advisers in this process.
The PoC norm in peacekeeping: A basic understanding
To illustrate a basic understanding of the PoC norm, we briefly examine the language 
agreed upon in UNSC resolutions and key UN documents. The UNSC first used the 
phrase ‘to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’ in 
Resolution 1270, mandating UNAMSIL (Security Council, 1999). The phrase is 
restrictive as it does not authorize the general use of force to protect civilians, only its 
use in situations when civilians are about to be harmed (Holt and Taylor, 2009). That 
phrase, or slight variations, has since been used by the UNSC to mandate 11 peace-
keeping operations.4
Through several reform initiatives over the past 15 years, the UN has continuously 
developed its thinking on how PoC should be implemented by the various actors involved 
in peacekeeping, seeking to limit uncertainty and the scope for interpretation by risk-
averse states (United Nations, 2000, 2015a, 2015b, 2015d). The 2015 PoC guidelines 
provide a summary of a three-tiered approach to PoC implementation: tier I — protection 
through dialogue and engagement; tier II — provision of physical protection; and tier III 
— establishment of a protective environment (United Nations, 2015a).
These efforts speak to the expectations of second-wave constructivists, noting that 
problems with implementation gaps can be addressed by specifying normative content 
further and further. However, as we will see in the next section, ambiguity remains. Even 
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the standard phrase ‘to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence’ leaves open the means by which civilians should be protected. Although it 
strongly suggests the use of force, it does not specify whether such force should be offen-
sive or defensive. This is an indicator of potentially different meanings that may emerge 
in implementation practices.
The PoC norm and the use of force: A practical understanding
Military advisers display widely differing understandings of the role that the use of force 
plays and should play in implementing the PoC norm. We find differences in how mili-
tary advisers defined the key phrase ‘protecting civilians from the imminent threat of 
physical violence’ and whether PoC implementation should require the offensive or 
defensive use of force. This highlights the continued presence of normative ambiguity 
throughout the implementation process. The following section uses survey questions for 
structuring purposes but maps and analyses information on implementation practices 
gained through all three methods.
Question 1: What is meant by ‘protecting civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence’?
Although responses to this question indicated a basic, shared understanding, only four 
responses included explicit references to the use of force, such as ‘being prepared to use 
force, including lethal force’ (see Table 2). Given that this phrase deals explicitly with 
protection from physical violence, this indicates a considerable divergence of envi-
sioned implementation practices on the use of force and also the avoidance thereof. 
Table 2 groups the open answers provided to this question into four categories depend-
ing on what they concentrate on: (1) define contours of protection; (2) focus on what 
counts as an imminent threat; (3) refer to the use of force; and (4) critical of the defini-
tion. Most responses of military advisers attempted to ‘define the contours for the pro-
tection of civilians’ (7) rather than explicitly mentioning the use of force. The four 
responses we labelled as ‘focus on what counts as an imminent threat’ also attempt to 
clarify the phrase. This focus on applied definitions in practice indicates the consider-
able impact of implementation when it comes to what constitutes the PoC norm. One 
answer was critical of the phrase, noting its inadequacy for explaining implementation. 
Interestingly, this answer mentioned the lack of intelligence, an issue particularly prom-
inent in responses to question 3.
Overall, these answers point to numerous diverging interpretations and implementa-
tion practices regarding the key phrase defining the PoC norm in a peacekeeping setting. 
This underlines that even a phrase that is at face value clear contains normative 
ambiguity.
Question 2: In what way is the use of force as a last resort an important option for peace-
keeping aimed at PoC? Responses of military advisers indicate a division of opinion on 
what counts as appropriate implementation practices on the use of force. There is a basic 
split between those who emphasize the strict last-resort nature of using force to protect 
civilians in case-by-case assessments, and those who see implementing the use of force 
as a last resort as an obligation of peacekeepers upon which the legitimacy of the entire 
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Table 2. Q1: What is meant by ‘protecting civilians from the imminent threat of physical 
violence’?
Label Examples
Define contours of 
protection (7)
x  ‘Mechanisms have been established which will ensure that 
civilians will not be systematically attacked by any group in the 
conflict area.’
x  ‘Set a secure environment in order to ensure the integrity of the 
persons.’
Focus on what 
counts as an 
imminent threat (4)
x ‘Protect against a threat that can occur at any time.’
x  ‘When there is knowledge of a present and real danger or threat 
of physical violence against civilians that is about to happen 
immediately or within a very short time frame.’
Refer to the use of 
force (4)
x  ‘To allow soldiers to protect civilians when there is a threat. As 
we saw in Rwanda and Srebrenica, they have just witnessed mass 
killing without doing nothing because of the mandate.’
x ‘Being prepared to use force, including up to lethal force.’
Critical of  
definition (1)
x  ‘“Protecting civilians from the imminent threat of physical 
violence” is inadequate considering the constraints and realities 
on the ground. A UN force needs sufficient situational awareness 
to anticipate likely or potential threats to the civilian population 
and take appropriate action to prevent the threat and thereby 
protect the civilians from physical violence, i.e., discharge its 
mandate effectively!’
Notes: Open question (N = 16). Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of references in this category.
Table 3. Q2: In what way is the use of force as a last resort an important option for 





x  ‘It gives the peacekeepers the right, but also the obligation, to use 
their available force to protect civilians when no other option is 
available. It is the primary condition for effective PoC mandate 
implementation.’
x ‘To show the strength of international determination.’




x ‘Using military force directly against the perpetrator of violence.’
x  ‘This is up to the commanders in the field to judge and take appropriate 
measures they deem necessary.’
Last resort (4) x  ‘All diplomatic channels and attempts to engage parties of concern 
must be exercised before resorting to the use of force. This should 
only be used when all other recourse has failed and the lives of civilians 
are in clear danger.’
x ‘When there is no other way of protection and life is in danger.’
Notes: Open question (N = 16). Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of references in this category.
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operation hinges (see Table 3). This division points to diverging practices for implement-
ers of the ambiguous PoC norm.
Discussions at the workshop echoed this uneasy division between implementation 
practices considered as ‘appropriate’ when it comes to the use of force. Whereas some 
military advisers argued that the use of force is dependent on an operational case-by-case 
decision, highlighting selectivity when applying force, another military adviser saw a 
particular use-of-force-oriented interpretation of the PoC norm as determining successful 
implementation: ‘peacekeeping is essentially for the protection of civilians’, adding that 
‘you have failed your mission if you don’t protect civilians. You have failed humanity’.
Question 3: Do you have examples of situations where it is difficult to decide whether force 
should be applied? The question presented military advisers with 12 different reasons for 
why it could be difficult to decide whether to apply force in implementing PoC. The top 
three general answers given were ‘lack of intelligence’ (14 out of 17), ‘armed groups 
embedded in population’ (13 out of 17) and ‘fighting occurred between several armed 
groups’ (10 out of 17) (see Figure 1).
Equipping UN peacekeeping operations with modern intelligence capability for force 
protection and mandate implementation has long been controversial on the grounds of 
the sovereignty concerns of host and neighbouring states. It was thus surprising to see 
that ‘lack of intelligence capabilities’ was the top answer to this question, signalling sig-
nificant convergence on the need to equip the UN with such capabilities. Several other 
categories could also concern this perceived lack of intelligence capacity: ‘unclear which 
civilians should be protected’ (6 out of 17); ‘fighting occurred between several armed 
groups’ (10 out of 17); ‘armed groups were embedded among the population’ (13 out of 
Figure 1. Question 3: Do you have examples of situations where it is difficult to decide 
whether force should be applied?
Note: Multiple answers possible (N = 17).
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17); and ‘imminence of threat to civilians cannot be evaluated’ (8 out of 17). Intelligence 
is important ‘to be there in good time’, as one interviewee stated, while also cautioning 
that the right resources must be available to react on the basis of additional information. 
However, since the lack of intelligence has long been the Achilles heel and familiar defi-
cit of UN peacekeeping (Dorn, 2011; Karlsrud and Rosén, 2013; United Nations, 2000, 
2015c), mentioning it might also be a convenient excuse for inaction.
Further interesting results indicating diverging implementation practices relate to 
rules of engagement (RoE): ‘unclear rules of engagement’ (9 out of 17); ‘unclear about 
how much force should be used’ (9 out of 17); and ‘limits on the use of force from home 
country’ (7 out of 17). In discussions about the use of force, unclear RoE have histori-
cally been the most frequent explanation used when refraining from the use of force. As 
a result, the UN has put considerable emphasis on the need to make the RoE explicit and 
clear. The Secretary-General repatriated commanders and units from the UN/African 
Union (AU) mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in March 2016 and the UN Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS) Force Commander in November 2016, who did not perform according 
to expectations (United Nations, 2016a, 2016b). Both the HIPPO report and its follow-up 
threatened that entire contingents could be sent home in the future: ‘Consistent underper-
formers must be warned officially and repatriated if they fail to improve’ (United Nations, 
2015b: 57; see also United Nations, 2015c: 5). However, the fact that most troops must 
relate not only to the RoE received from the UN, but also to national RoEs, which might 
be more restrictive, has frequently been acknowledged as challenging: ‘The ability of 
field commanders to ensure performance is severely hampered, however, by the use of 
caveats and national controls’ (United Nations, 2015b: 57).
To control for possible changes in these national guidelines and caveats from UN 
RoE, and following up on the recommendations of the HIPPO report, the Secretary-
General advised:
Additional caveats beyond those explicitly agreed by the Secretariat cannot be accepted after 
deployment. I have instructed all missions to communicate to Headquarters any incidents of 
refusal to follow orders given by the Force Commander or the Police Commissioner, whether 
on grounds of new national caveats or others. The Secretariat will immediately inform the 
concerned Member State and, on a regular basis, the Security Council and, where no remedial 
action is forthcoming, will repatriate the unit concerned. (United Nations, 2015c: 21)
Analytically, these UN efforts follow a belief that the ambiguity of the PoC norm can 
be reduced. However, our findings on the implementation practices of military advisers 
point to consistent ambiguity, coming out as a cat-and-mouse game. TCCs want to keep 
their space for manoeuvre as regards interpreting the RoE in order to minimize risks and 
maximize freedom of action when it comes to implementing the PoC norm in the field; 
the UN is constantly seeking to make the RoE as precise as possible to limit the possibili-
ties of differing interpretations and resulting inaction. States do not want to be called out 
as behaving inappropriately, so they have been cooperating in developing the RoE at UN 
headquarters, eager to be seen as proactive and constructive partners. When we shared 
our survey results with Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) staff, they were 
surprised to hear that the RoE were still deemed unclear — they thought that these prob-
lems had been ‘sufficiently resolved’ (see United Nations, 2015d).
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At the workshop, one of the military advisers declared that ‘RoE will always be 
unclear’ — there is no national legal framework on UN RoE, and there will always be 
varying national definitions on what counts as self-defence. The same representative 
challenged the threat that units would be repatriated, saying that while it may be possible 
to have an upfront agreement on caveats at the time when contingents are deployed, they 
‘will still be subject to change when the environment deteriorates’. Other military advis-
ers stressed the need to constantly adjust and translate the RoE to realities on the ground.
Eagerness to contribute to further deliberative, normative development is positive, but 
while emphasizing the need to contextualize the RoE to the implementation situation on 
the ground may be seen as constructive, it could also be seen as a way of continually 
moving the ‘agreed-upon’ goalposts in order to ensure enough ambiguity to warrant 
inaction. Situations where civilians need protection will always have a sui generis ele-
ment; in the end, action/inaction will hinge on the interpretation and calculation of chal-
lenges, risks and means on the ground, undertaken by the individual force and/or 
contingent commander. Taken together, this also underlines the continuous ambiguity 
inherent in central operationalisations of the PoC norm.
The offensive and defensive use of force to protect civilians in peacekeeping missions (Q5 and 
Q6). Two survey questions differentiated between the offensive and defensive use of 
force to protect civilians in peacekeeping. Again, the responses of military advisers 
pointed to greatly diverging understandings manifesting in different implementation 
practices. Twelve out of 19 respondents indicated that their country differentiates 
between offensive and defensive steps, while seven respondents said that they did not 
(Q5). Question 6 allowed a more detailed look at the stances of military advisers: ‘In 
what way does the potential of using force affect your country’s decision to participate in 
peacekeeping operations?’ As Figure 2 shows, many military advisers saw the use of 
Figure 2. Q6: In what way does the potential of using force affect your country’s decision to 
participate in peacekeeping operations?
Note: N = 18.
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force as a ‘last resort but an integral option’ (7 out of 18), whereas others agreed on its 
centrality but were also ‘sensitive towards risks’ (3 out of 18).
Only one respondent indicated that they would engage solely in defensive rather than 
offensive force when participating in peacekeeping. Moreover, none of the military 
advisers said that their country was reluctant to participate in peacekeeping operations 
that included an explicit use-of-force element. This was underlined at the workshop by 
one military adviser, who noted: ‘I don’t see any country having any issue with protect-
ing civilians in danger’. However, responses in the ‘other’ category (6 out of 18) tell a 
different story. Again, military advisers were split between those indicating that their 
country supported a ‘robust posture’ and those who said that their country decided on a 
case-by-case basis and would ‘contribute in a niche capability of our strength’ — a stance 
far more reluctant and cautious.
This split also came up in the workshop. The choice between offensive and defensive 
steps and how these should be defined led to a heated discussion between two military 
advisers. It is here that we can most clearly see the military advisers’ positioning in a 
conflictual norm-scape manifesting in diverging assessments of what are appropriate 
implementation practices. One military adviser advocated a strictly defensive under-
standing of the use of force and the importance of using force solely on the tactical level. 
In his statement, he included two assessments: ‘we don’t believe in offensive operations, 
but we believe in the use of force to protect civilians’; and ‘offensive operations are part 
of the problem’. This practice hints at other defining norms of peacekeeping, in particu-
lar, impartiality and consent/sovereignty concerns. At the workshop, this provoked an 
emotionally charged response from another military adviser, with images of past failures 
of peacekeeping because force was not used, underscoring that peacekeepers need the 
‘right’ mindset not only to protect civilians, but also to protect themselves: ‘You can’t go 
into peacekeeping saying “I am not ready to fight”. Then don’t do it. Don’t provide con-
tingents.… Every peacekeeping operation must be well equipped and psyched to protect 
themselves and civilians’.
Several military advisers echoed and supported these sentiments, while others kept 
silent or tried to shift the discussion to another topic, stressing how peacekeeping has too 
often been used as a ‘band-aid’, merely satisfying the need to ‘be doing something’. This 
division also came out in interviews, with some highlighting the primacy of the political 
process (‘we don’t go there for permanence’; ‘peacekeeping should be short, for a spe-
cific purpose’) and others noting that national caveats should be clear before deployment 
(‘Don’t bring caveats when you are deployed. Once you deploy, we expect you to have 
done your homework’). These statements point to diverging views on what constitutes 
effectiveness in peacekeeping, as well as the presence of a conflictual norm-scape.
Group dynamics and debating appropriate implementation practices: The 
Kigali Principles
In addition to demonstrating diverging implementation practices and thereby highlight-
ing how the PoC norm gets filled with substantive content through practices, the work-
shop provided insights into the military advisers as a community (see also Krieger et al., 
2015). Through this, military advisers not only negotiate intersubjective assessments, but 
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also ascertain competing competence claims when it comes to appropriate implementa-
tion practices with regard to the PoC norm. We illustrate the latter dynamics through 
considering the Kigali Principles, a member-state initiative led by African states ostensi-
bly designed to improve the implementation of the PoC norm by having TCCs declare 
their readiness to use force, resonating with a shorter-term definition of peacekeeping 
effectiveness.
First, on an intersubjective level, we noted appeals to a shared understanding of the 
community as a whole, for example, through their military identity and a shared sense of 
being ‘operators’. Two military advisers commented on the survey results as follows, 
drawing many nods of approval from the room: ‘for the military, it’s very straightfor-
ward’ and ‘military advisers tend to provide pragmatic answers, issues are seen as more 
clear-cut’. Similar responses emerged from our interviews, with one respondent noting 
that there is agreement in technical discussions among military advisers but ‘then we 
have to go to the capital’. On the one hand, military advisers tend to see themselves and 
their way of approaching PoC as distinct from that of the political dimension; on the 
other hand, as our findings show, there is far more ambiguity than coherence among the 
implementation practices favoured by military advisers than indicated in these state-
ments of shared identity. Still, it is inherently appealing to refer to a ‘shared’ military 
standard of practice that makes it possible to link diverging practices and ensuing veritable 
challenges to the choices made by political actors. Further, military advisers evinced dif-
fering conceptualizations of their roles: while some saw their role as ‘operators’ almost 
totally defined by strategic choices made at the political level, others acknowledged that 
‘operators’ necessarily engage in operational translation, for example, of the RoE. This 
indicates split awareness or acknowledgement of the relationship between norm-making 
and norm implementation.
Second, the discussion among military advisers about the Kigali Principles aptly 
underlines competing claims, based on their diverse backgrounds, for what count as 
appropriate and competent implementation practices of the PoC norm. Initiated at a high-
level conference in May 2015, the Kigali Principles have been endorsed by 44 states as 
of December 2017,5 including 11 of the top-20 TCCs and three of the P-5 (France, the 
UK and the US). Some interviewees mentioned that their states endorsed the Kigali 
Principles because ‘we saw this as an opportunity’ or ‘we joined the process because of 
conviction’; others did not perceive the Kigali Principles as an ‘inclusive process’ 
because they had been drafted at a ministerial-level conference with only nine states 
involved. While it remains unclear whether only this limited number of states had been 
invited, some TCCs objected to this way of organizing, that is, being presented with a 
text rather than having a say in drafting it. Agreeing on language is, after all, a recurrent 
and touchy issue at the UN.
Disagreement about what kind of language is appropriate and how to understand 
PoC is linked with ‘the different strategic experiences at the field level in highly 
diverse peacekeeping operations’ that military advisers bring with them. One inter-
viewee noted that part of the wording of principle no. 3 — ‘taking direct military 
action against armed actors with clear hostile intent to harm civilians’ (Government of 
Rwanda, 2015: 4) — is problematic as it does not acknowledge the limitations of the 
UN system: ‘the role of the UN is not like that of a country, it does not have the hold 
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on resources’. In the words of another military adviser: ‘The Kigali Principles are now 
facing the language problem. This is very sensitive for some countries [pause]. I can’t 
believe it’s an excuse’. Military advisers thus justify stances in opposition to and in 
support of the Kigali Principles as examples for competent behaviour. They also under-
line disputes about which and whose implementation practices are appropriate as some 
interviewees objected to perceived Rwandan or even African ownership of this pro-
cess: ‘This is UN peacekeeping after all, not AU peacekeeping, so the UN should own 
it’. Interestingly, one interviewee opined that PoC ‘is personal for Africa. If we own it 
as Africans, it will be good for the rest of the world’. The Kigali Principles therefore 
illustrate how the overall condition of normative ambiguity opens room for disputes 
and also for, in this case, African efforts to promote particular implementation prac-
tices at the more robust end of the spectrum as appropriate (see also Dembinski, 2017). 
The latter observation highlights the relevance of considering actors of the Global 
South as norm-makers at international sites.
In sum, our findings show that the UN’s continued efforts to provide clarity on what 
PoC should mean proved futile due to inherent norm ambiguity resulting in diverging 
implementation practices, as well as the positioning of military advisers in a conflictual 
norm-scape. In distinguishing between the offensive and defensive use of force to protect 
civilians, or in identifying practical, operational challenges to implementing PoC, mili-
tary advisers therefore refer to diverging interpretations of the PoC norm and how it is 
positioned in conflict with the particular understandings of other core peacekeeping 
norms, such as impartiality and consent of the parties.
Figure 3 offers a region-based overview of how the three core constituencies cur-
rently chiefly responsible for implementing the military dimension of the PoC norm 
(African, Asian and Western states) are placed in an ambiguous, conflictual norm-
scape with regard to peacekeeping.6 It shows both important overlaps between (and 
within) these groups in terms of the normative meanings that they associate with core 
peacekeeping norms, and vast differences, therefore providing a summary of the 
diversity of implementation practices among military advisers. Our analysis shows 
that the implementation process of ambiguous norms such as PoC is messy. Therefore, 
we can group normative meanings, as Figure 3 does, rather than neatly map practices 
to norms.
Conclusion
We have shown how the ambiguous content of norms manifests and emerges in their 
implementation through practices, using the military dimensions of the PoC norm in 
peacekeeping as an example. Fully integrating ambiguity into theorizing norms and 
focusing on implementation at international sites draws attention to different actors. Our 
focus has been military advisers as important links implementing core norms in peace-
keeping policy in between national ministries and contingents in the field. We have used 
a survey, a workshop and follow-up interviews to show how military advisers put for-
ward diverging understandings of the PoC norm based on their field experience, and 
operate in a conflictual norm-scape. Mapping these understandings and their associated 
implementation practices can help explain why use-of-force practices, although an 
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integral component of PoC in peacekeeping, diverge consistently among states. 
Ambiguity in peacekeeping norms fulfils essential functions for actors. For states, we 
find that it allows flexibility to judge how much risk their troops should be exposed to in 
any given situation and the ability to determine this on a case-by-case basis. For the UN, 
ambiguity enables plausible explanations for why action is taken in one instance but not 
replicated in the next, and for all parties to save face and continue their cooperation with-
out damaging political relations.
We considered military advisers as performers and carriers of implementation prac-
tices in discussions on PoC at UN headquarters in New York. Combining critical-
constructivist norms research with practice theories sheds new conceptual light on the 
process of norm implementation at international sites, including by actors of the Global 
South that have not typically been at the centre of analytical efforts. Military advisers are 
a particularly interesting group to study as these practitioners-cum-diplomats bring both 
reflexive experience and reflective knowledge to the table, and aim to influence the 
evolving understanding of a norm through its diverging implementation. In discussing 
their states’ practices, military advisers make different appeals to competence in order to 
frame how they understand implementation practices and even inaction, surrounding the 
PoC norm in ways that still reflect favourably on the contingent and state, and provide 
Figure 3. TCCs in a conflictual norm-scape.
Note: These assessments are general and there continues to be variation across regions.
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input in supposedly ‘refining’ the norm to increase the short-term effectiveness of UN 
peacekeeping. On the basis of this finding, we contend that practical knowledge need not 
be ‘unthinking’: it is produced by reflective processes and shows careful calculation of 
the ways in which practices are presented.
Our analysis has informed the theory-oriented debate on critical norms research in IR 
by continuously integrating normative ambiguity and conceptually refining the produc-
tive powers of practices in studying normative content via practice theories. This high-
lights the role of implementation practices and their subsequent interpretation as practices 
of representation at the diplomatic level. Likewise, our study points towards interesting 
new dimensions of research on norms in IR by exploring how implementation dynamics 
shape what norms ‘are’ in practices. We argue that norms can never be ‘settled’ in content 
when their very design, as well as contextual specificity on the ground and flexible posi-
tionality in a conflictual norm-scape, allows for coexisting meanings.
Our observations also point to further areas of research, such as the extent to 
which military advisers form an epistemic community with a meaningful horizontal 
network of connections.7 The dynamic processes that we identified in relation to the 
PoC norm could also provide innovative angles of analysis for the implementation 
trajectories of international norms at international sites from environmental protec-
tion to non-proliferation.
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Association of the UN (DGVN) in July 2016 for making this point.
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Republic (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) 2007, SCR 
1778), Lebanon (UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 2006, SCR 1701), Abyei/Sudan 
(UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) 2011, SCR 1990), Central African Republic 
(UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) 2014, SCR 2149), and Mali (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 2014, SCR 2164).
5. Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Canada, Djibouti, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Ghana, 
Guinea, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Montenegro, Nepal, The Netherlands, 
Niger, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, the UK, the US, Uruguay and Zambia 
(Global R2P, 2017).
6. Figure 3 combines insights from our empirical findings with published literature (Andersen, 
2018; Karlsrud, 2018; Koops and Tercovich, 2016; United Nations, 2018). The sizing of the 
circles indicates more/less significant troop contributions, just as the size of the overlapping 
areas indicates more/less shared practices.
7. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.
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